第3回研究会のお知らせ〔5月24日（金）17:00～〕
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記
日 時： 5月24日(金) 17:00～18:30
場 所： 経商研究棟 ４F会議室
報告者：
村本 顕理 氏（大阪大学国際公共政策研究科助教）
村本 顕理 氏（大阪大学国際公共政策研究科助教）
タイトル：
“Price Announcement Effects in Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study”
(joint with Misato Inaba, Takahiro Miura, Kazuhito Ogawa, and Antonio Rosato)
“Price Announcement Effects in Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study”
(joint with Misato Inaba, Takahiro Miura, Kazuhito Ogawa, and Antonio Rosato)
＜要 旨＞
In private value sequential auctions, the canonical model predicts that the price announcement in a stage has no effect on later stages of auctions, while the model with expectation-based reference-dependent preference (Rosato, 2019) predicts that the price announcement has discouragement effect on them.
We investigate the price announcement effect by lab experiments with two stages of sequential first price auctions of three treatments: treatment 0, where no price is announced; treatment 1, where the winning price of the first stage auction is announced; treatment 2, where the winning price in the second stage auction is announced. Using the data of the experiment, we assess the three models:
(i) the canonical model;
(ii) Rosato (2019)’s model with expectation-based reference dependent preference and with real objects;
(iii) a modified model with the same preference as in Rosato (2019) but with virtual objects.
(ii) Rosato (2019)’s model with expectation-based reference dependent preference and with real objects;
(iii) a modified model with the same preference as in Rosato (2019) but with virtual objects.
We show that the existence of the price announcement effect and so that the prediction of canonical is inconsistent with the data. We also show that the prediction of the modified model is more consistent with data than the prediction of Rosato (2019)’s model.
以上