第5回研究会のお知らせ〔6月17日（月）18:00～〕
会 員 各 位
紫陽花がきれいな頃となりました。
皆様にはお変わりなくお過ごしのことと存じます。
さて下記の内容で第5回研究会をソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構と共催にて開催いたしますので、皆様、奮ってご参加いただきますよう、お願い申し上げます。
記
日 時：6月17日(月) 18:00～
場 所：マルチメディア・ラボ（ソシオネットワーク戦略研究機構 6Ｆ）
報告者：
粟屋 祐 氏（University of Rochester）
粟屋 祐 氏（University of Rochester）
タイトル：
“Startups and Upstarts” （Vijay Krishna 氏との共著）
“Startups and Upstarts” （Vijay Krishna 氏との共著）
＜要 旨＞
We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the firms is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly-informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent. When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Even though better information is available competitive disadvantage, the value of information is positive.
We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the firms is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly-informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent. When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Even though better information is available competitive disadvantage, the value of information is positive.